As the Mariners turn the page to a new season with renewed optimism, the memory of how close they came to a first World Series title still lingers. Just eight outs away from making franchise history. Coming up short in Game 7 to the Toronto Blue Jays, Dan Wilson left Eduard Bazardo in to face the top of the order, and a marginally misplaced pitch was punished. Wilson’s bullpen management had been a weakness all season in 2025 and showed up in the biggest moment.
The Decision That Defined 2025
While Bazardo had performed admirably throughout the series, the decision to leave him in that situation raised immediate questions. Wilson had used Bazardo throughout the series, and he had no rest following a heavy workload in Game 6. George Springer had faced him numerous times already. With the top of the lineup due up in the seventh inning, Wilson had kept the Mariners’ closer, Andrés Muñoz, one of the best in baseball, well rested and scarcely used up to that point. The lack of urgency and failure to adjust to the matchup ultimately proved costly, highlighting a more traditional approach to bullpen usage that did not align with the moment.
Dan Wilson deserves credit for guiding the Mariners to a 90-win season and fostering a strong clubhouse over the course of a 162-game schedule. However, his in-game bullpen management became a point of scrutiny in critical moments. After the opening series of 2026, in which Seattle split four games with Cleveland, there are already signs that similar decision-making patterns may persist, raising questions about whether those lessons have been fully applied.
Game 1
The first game of the series provided an early example of questionable bullpen management in a high-leverage situation. In the seventh inning, Wilson left Gabe Speier in to work through the bottom of the order, eventually facing José Ramírez with a runner on and two outs. At that point, Matt Brash was warming and ready, with a strong track record against Ramírez, including multiple strikeouts. With one out remaining in the inning, this presented a clear opportunity to prioritize matchup over inning structure. Instead, Wilson kept Speier in the game, and Ramírez capitalized with a two-run double that shifted the momentum.
Later in the game, the bullpen usage further reflected a conservative approach. Trailing by just one run, Seattle turned to two of their weakest bullpen options in Casey Legumina and Cooper Criswell in the eighth and ninth, respectively. In the opening game of the season, with a fully rested bullpen, the decision to preserve higher-leverage arms effectively removed the opportunity to stay competitive late. Even if the result is not guaranteed, the process should reflect an intent to maximize win probability.
Game 3
A similar pattern emerged in Game 3, again centered on timing and matchup awareness. Bazardo recorded two outs in the seventh inning before Steven Kwan, a left-handed hitter, stepped in. The bullpen had Speier, the team’s primary left-handed option, warmed and available, yet Wilson elected to leave Bazardo in for the matchup. The result was a single that gave Cleveland a seventh-inning lead. Only after that plate appearance did he turn to Speier for the following hitter.
Lessons Learned?
These sequences reflect a recurring issue in decision-making: reacting one step too late in key moments. Rather than anticipating matchups and acting proactively, the bullpen usage follows a more rigid innings-based structure. While the ultimate outcomes may not always change, consistently missing optimal leverage points limits the team’s ability to control close games. After similar concerns in 2025 relating to bullpen usage, the lack of visible adjustment in these early-season situations from Dan Wilson will be something to monitor as the season progresses.
(Top Image Credit: Mark J. Rebilas-Imagn Images)
