If you haven’t yet, make sure to check out part one of this series here.
After the US bowed out of the World Cup and the newly converted soccer-loving American populace fought their way through the resulting emotional hangover, the collective focus of the soccer world shifted to the future.
The standout performances of surprisingly effective young players like John Brooks, Julian Green, and DeAndre Yedlin made it impossible not to be hopeful for what the core group of young Americans could become by 2018. The increasing amount of top young prospects playing in top leagues and being well-acquainted with the National Team setup was surely a step forward, and the introduction of players like Emerson Hyndman, Rubio Rubin, and Joe Gyau in the following months was more evidence that a commitment to youth was being made.
Along with the sudden influx of young players came the question of whether or not they would be able to stick with their club teams. A lack of first-team playing time had stunted the growth of players like Brek Shea and, to a degree, Jozy Altidore, while the injury bug has had a history of messing with promising Americans as well.
But in the fall of 2014, everything was looking good for this group. Gyau was making progress with Borussia Dortmund’s reserve side, Hyndman was a regular starter for Fulham, and Rubin was getting meaningful minutes in the Eredivisie.
Gyau and Hyndman featured in the Yanks’ September win over the Czech Republic. Both players showed flashes of their potential, with Gyau looking as though he could be the answer to the post-Donovan era question of who fills the role of a game-changing left winger. In an unfortunate ironic twist, Gyau went down with a torn meniscus during the Landon Donovan send-off match just a month later.
But while Gyau’s injury was a setback to the group that was bound to happen at some point, more young blood found its way into the group via Rubin, who made his first start in November against Colombia, and Stanford University undergraduate student Jordan Morris. That name caught the eye of many when he was included in the team sheet against Ireland, and his play caught the eye of many more during his short cameo towards the end of what was an otherwise dreadful performance from the Americans.
The loss to an Irish B-team by four goals to one was the first blaring air raid siren to stand out among a growing number of red flags popping up all over the field for Klinsmann’s side. The gradual transition of Yedlin to a winger, something I can only describe as the Timmy Chandler Experience, the reluctance to give an in-form Lee Nguyen more than twelve minutes, and a downright refusal to try anyone but Kyle Beckerman in the No. 6 spot were all interesting quirks in the style and personnel choices of the post-World Cup experimentation phase.
While Klinsmann and most rational supporters continued to stress that the results of these games didn’t matter as far as the scoreline, few could disagree that it was becoming hard to ignore some of the recurring issues facing the US National Team. Most notably among these issues was the increasingly apparent problem of giving up late goals.
What I’m describing as a tendency really escalated from pattern to trend to dangerous habit very quickly. Coughing up leads to what were, on paper, inferior teams (even though the results don’t matter!) quickly became an almost humorous norm for the Americans. From October 2014 until this past April, Klinsmann’s men gave up a goal after the 80th minute in every match they played.
Chalk it up to an ever-changing rotation of players along the back line, blame it on the ill-fated 45 minutes of the 3-5-2, or lament the continuous inclusion of Bobby Wood before he made the transition from a goat to the G.O.A.T. The truth remains that the consistently disappointing results of that time period really didn’t mean a thing.
Of course, it’s easy to go back months later and come to that conclusion, even though it sort of felt like the sky was falling during a six month span in which the USMNT squandered match after match. However, if you peel back the film of unfavorable scorelines, it’s easy to pick out bright spots. Shea’s transition to fullback yielded both immediate positives and showcased his potential at the position. Yedlin’s move from fullback to winger had the look of a promising change. Morris grabbed his first opportunity to make an impression with the National Team by the horns and parlayed it into a recurring role with the team. Particularly in Morris’ case, the hunger he exhibited along with his skill and willingness to try things was a welcome surprise. Zardes made good on his chance to break into the squad with an admirable performance against Panama in February, subsequently becoming a regular in Klinsmann’s rosters.
The bottom line in this situation was that the consistently disappointing results of post-World Cup friendlies don’t really mean anything. What does carry weight, however, is the blooding and integration of promising younger players, as well as the tactical flexibility gained from Klinsmann’s tinkering with formations and personnel. As long as the squad is getting better in whatever way, the individual results are to be discounted.
Unless the opponent is Mexico. Then it’s Dos A Cero or bust.
So when the US Men’s National Team trotted out in San Antonio wearing their brand new blue kits, there was no question that this was a game to be won. After a Winter of experimentation, it was time for the USMNT to show what they’d learned about themselves. But would those experiments bear fruit? A coach can tinker all he wants, but when it comes down to wins and losses, can he put his players in the best position to come out on top?
As it turned out, yes. Klinsmann’s winter of mad scientist behavior looked to have been worth it going forward. In fact, some of that mad scientist experimentation proved fruitful immediately. The shock of seeing Morris in the starting lineup against the Americans’ arch rivals was only compounded when the young collegiate showed off his ability to burn players with his speed. Of course, that shock hit a peak when he showed the composure and technique to set himself up for a shot with a measured first touch and then proceeded to send the American fans in the stadium into a frenzy with his first international goal.
Later in the second half, Juan Agudelo took a long ball from Michael Bradley out of the air and settled it on a surface best described as concrete covered in a dirty carpet and fired it home to seal the Dos a Cero scoreline. Like I wrote earlier, results always matter against Mexico and this was the ideal finish to a match that was a little bit of a turning point before the Gold Cup.
The result wasn’t the only thing that needed to be analyzed, though. As it goes with soccer, results can be nicked in just about any fashion, but nearly four years and a significant experimentation period later, the Americans showcased one of their most complete performances against their rivals to the south. Goals from Agudelo and Morris, coupled with convincing performances from Mix Diskerud, Ventura Alvarado, William Yarbrough, and Perry Kitchen signified that the youth movement was here. After a period of uncertainty and disappointment, some of the team’s younger prospects had something along the lines of a coming out party against an opponent that, both on paper and throughout history, commands a top performance.
The young guns were tested, and they delivered. In the process of evaluating a coach, it’s incredibly important not to overlook what he’s able to get out of players who don’t necessarily have the experience and maturity of others. For Klinsmann to throw a group with a significant number of newcomers and 20-23 year-olds out against Mexico on a horrible pitch in a stadium with a raucous, heavily pro-Mexico crowd and come out with a comprehensive 2-0 victory is impressive.
This result is what this period should be remembered for. Klinsmann showed he had the ability to come to positive, productive conclusions based on what he learned from a series of friendlies during which he tested the boundaries of this group’s ability to play. Both individually and as a unit, Klinsmann put his players in positions where it was up to them to sink or swim. In situations where there is time to build for the future and immediate results aren’t the primary concern, that’s a viable strategy and sometimes it will make or break a player based on their ability to rise to the occasion. When results are on the line, the known quantities developed from these periods of experimentation are important in formulating a first-choice lineup.
This period ended on a definite high note, and it was the beginning of another period of optimism that would carry through June.
And then the USMNT beat the Netherlands 4-3 and Germany 2-0 on European soil and every cloud that had ever cut off the sun’s light from shining on Klinsmann disappeared, and he was bathed in its glorious light. Suddenly, everyone forgot all about the mantra of friendly matches being meaningless, and put their stock in matches like these. Matches in which no trophies were on the line. Matches in which six substitutions were allowed.
It looked to many as if the US would cruise through the Gold Cup on the backs of the young, hungry players who made the difference against the world’s Goliaths.
Instead, Klinsmann chose the same aging group of midfielders and questionable center back pairings that made up the ineffective portions of his experimental phase and the squad suffered. The US failed to play proactive soccer against minnows like Haiti, whom they managed to scrape by 1-0, and only really passed the eye test against an in-shambles Cuban team.
Soon, the US had crashed out of the Gold Cup semifinals. Their worst finish since 2000 was made worse by the fact that the 2-1 loss to Jamaica was the USMNT’s first loss to a Caribbean team on US soil since 1968.
We took a very apparent step backwards. Nobody can argue that our style of play was proactive, or meaningful, or aesthetically pleasing at any point during the Gold Cup. It’s impossible. The US looked tired, lacked cohesion of any sort, relied on repeated emergency defending to keep teams out and set pieces to score goals. It was poor soccer.
The blatant lack of cohesion, highlighted by haphazard defending and an inability to complete passes through the midfield, is entirely down to coaching. Specifically, it is facilitated by failing to commit to a back line who have played together, changing the formation in front of them, and playing players out of position.
It was the same old story, and the same old results.
Saturday night, the US played Mexico because they didn’t win this Summer’s Gold Cup. In order to qualify for the most important pre-World Cup tournament, they had to take a detour through LA and play our fiercest rival in a hostile environment.
They failed to win, and the program took another step backwards. The US were thoroughly outclassed by a Mexican team who were not themselves a world-beating side. The US lined up with the same failing, aging mix of players that couldn’t get it done in the Gold Cup, and it showed.
It’s not that the players aren’t individually good enough to beat Mexico. Many of those in the USMNT’s starting XI have done so in the past. What happened is that a year of tinkering, a string of poor results, and a coach under no pressure to win, took any progress that could have been made since the 2014 World Cup and flushed it down the drain. New bodies were brought in and out throughout that year, but none were brought in until the team was floundering in extra time.
Five years into his regime, Klinsmann played a left back who had previously RETIRED from international play 120 minutes with a trophy and a Confederations Cup berth on the line. He played a 33 year-old Jermaine Jones out of position on the left wing. He waited until long after players were clearly gassed to make any of the necessary changes to the side.
The result is that the US played against Mexico like minnows would play against Spain, and we paid for it.
So now we have nothing to show for a year of experimental free will, and the calls for the end of the Klinsmann era are getting louder and louder.
However, those calls fall on deaf ears. His job is safe and he knows his job is safe, which allows him the arrogance to say things like, “I’m not here to be liked, I’m trying to do a good job.”
Please, by all means, when can you start?
Main Photo: Kevork Djansezian, Getty Images
